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 STANDARDS OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION POLICY 
 
 Herbert Hovenkamp1 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
 Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of 
anticompetitive standard setting.  Antitrust fact finders lack the sophistication 
to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard.  In any event, 
antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards.  It requires an 
injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for competitive 
harm are present can often be determined without examining the substance 
of the standard itself. 
 
 When government involvement in standard setting is substantial 
antitrust challenges should generally be rejected.  The petitioning process in 
a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral 
attack.  In any event, antitrust's purpose is to correct private markets.  It is 
not a general corrective for political processes that have gone awry.  The 
best case for antitrust liability occurs when the government has somehow 
been deceived into adopting a standard that it would not have adopted had it 
known the true facts.  Even then, nonantitrust remedies such as equitable 
estoppel are probably a superior solution. 
                                            
1.  Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa 
College of Law. 
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Introduction 
 
 Antitrust's purpose is to protect competition, while giving firms 
reasonable freedom to innovate, develop, produce and distribute their 
products.  While standard setting can enable firms to improve along all of 
these avenues of business progress, it can also facilitate both of antitrust's 
twin evils: collusion and exclusion.  This essay explores some of the ways 
antitrust policy can evaluate claims that privately promulgated standards are 
anticompetitive without hindering socially beneficial conduct. 
 
 For antitrust purposes a standard is usefully defined as a set of 
technical specifications that provides a common design for some product or 
process.2  While the focus of standard setting today is high technology 
industries with significant technological sophistication, the history of antitrust 
reaches back to standards that were less complex.  The Supreme Court's 
first antitrust decision on the merits involved a joint running arrangement 
among railroads that included a significant standard setting component.  The 
Supreme Court condemned the arrangement as nothing more than a cartel, 
ignoring the lower courts' conclusions that the agreement was intended 
primarily to coordinate schedules and standardize freight classifications, 
cargo transfer protocols, and the like.3 
 
 In some ways standards resemble intellectual property rights.  
Economically, the increased welfare that they produce is largely a 
consequence of product improvement, not of prices that are brought closer 
                                            
2.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis and Mark A. Lemley, IP and 
Antitrust: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property 
Law '35.1a (2002 & 2006 Supp.).  On antitrust and standard setting 
generally, see id., Ch. 35.  On standard setting more generally, see David J. 
Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 Minn. L.Rev. 
1913 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard 
Setting Organizations, 90 Cal.L.Rev. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 
479, 551 (1998). 
3.  United States v. TransBMissouri Freight Ass'n., 58 Fed. 58, 79B80 (8th 
Cir.1893), reversed, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540 (1897).  See also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 Yale. L.J. 1017, 1041 (1988).  Even the setting track 
gauges in nineteenth century railroading promoted a standards battle.  See 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 284 
(2006). 
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to marginal cost.  As a result, some of the same antinomies exist between 
antitrust and standard setting as exist between antitrust and IP rights.  
Effective promulgation of standards may involve a certain amount of 
coordination of output by rivals and a certain amount of market exclusion -- 
both things that antitrust generally abhors.  Further, the development of 
appropriate standards is often an R&D activity, characterized by up front 
costs and amortization over long time periods. 
 
 Standards also share one important characteristic with technology 
choices generally: they can become path dependent.  Once a standard is 
adopted and technology designed around the standard, switching costs 
increase, making the exercise of durable market power possible.  Standards 
are often subject to significant network effects.  As a result, they acquire 
increased value per user as they are more widely adopted.4  This can 
facilitate the exercise of market power, because the standard's owners will 
be able to charge more for products compatible with the standard, or 
perhaps for access to the standard itself.  Some but certainly not all 
standards are capable of conferring significant market power.  In certain 
cases an "insider" with respect to some standard has a significant market 
advantage over outsiders, and thus may be in a position to set a price 
substantially above costs.  This can happen if duplication of the standard is 
costly and compliance with it is essential for market success.  For example, 
when compatibility with the standard is technologically essential, or if a 
government rule requires that a specific standard be followed, standards can 
have significant exclusionary power provided that they are difficult to 
appropriate.  While IP rights do not inherently confer significant market 
power,5 some IP rights do, particularly if they control effective access to a 
market.  The same thing is largely true of standards.  Some are easily 
complied with, widely shared among a large group of firms, or unnecessary 
for successful competition in the market.6  Such standards are completely 
                                            
4.  For example, the model building code at issue in Allied Tube & Conduit 
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 (1988), was a standard with 
considerable exclusionary power because it was adopted almost verbatim by 
thousands of communities across the country. 
5.  See Illinois Tool Works, Inc. ("ITW") v. Independent Ink, Inc., ___ S.Ct. 
___, 2006 WL 468729 (March 1, 2006) (upsetting half century old antitrust 
presumption in the federal courts that a patent in a tying product gave its 
owner sufficient market power to make a tie unlawful). 
6.  See, e.g., Foundation for Interior Design Education Research v. 
Savannah College of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001) (privately 
promulgated accreditation standards for interior design schools not 
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consistent with robust competition.  However, others are tightly controlled 
and effective access may be restricted to a small number of firms.7 
 
 Standards can also have some of the other consumption 
characteristics shared by IP rights.  For example, an additional firm can 
adopt a standard without taking any production away from the standard's 
owner, other than the right to obtain royalties by licensing the standard.  At 
the same time many standards are not licensed at all, but are given away in 
the sense that anyone who is willing to conform to them is invited into the 
relevant area of enterprise.8 
 
 The most likely economic effect of private standard setting is 
increased social value.  By promulgating standards producers can increase 
both horizontal and vertical compatibility.  "Horizontal" compatibility refers to 
compatibility as between competing goods that are subject to a standard.  
For example,  a user can substitute one brand of compact disc, computer 
monitor, or shotgun shell for another in the same computer or shotgun.  
"Vertical" compatibility refers to the ability of goods to use the same inputs.  
For example, all Windows computers run the same software, or all 
automobiles burn the same gasoline.  Standards can also reduce consumer 
search costs and increase consumer confidence, significantly reduce the 
costs of input suppliers, make networking possible or at least much more 
efficient, or facilitate the achievement of scale economies.  As a result there 
                                                                                                                                   
anticompetitive because there was no evidence that "accredited" schools 
had any market advantages over non-accredited ones); George R. Whitten, 
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 558 (1st Cir.1974) 
(private standard setting for swimming pool heating and circulatory systems 
did not restrain trade because it appeared that most builders ignored the 
standard, which had no legal force). 
7.  E.g., Union Oil Co., ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15618 
(FTC, July 6, 2004) (patented standard for cleaner burning gasoline 
mandated by state law); Rambus, Inc., 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15556 
(FTC, Feb. 23, 2004) (patented standard for RAM chips). 
8.  See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 
1980); Brown v. Indianapolis Board of Realtors, 1977-1 Trade Cases  
&61,435 (S.D.Ind., 1977, unreported), both of which note the generally open 
standards for membership on real estate brokerage boards.  Cf. Visa U.S.A., 
Inc. v. SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 
U.S. 1151 (1995) (Visa joint venture open to any institution that qualifies for 
FDIC insurance). 
Hovenkamp, Standards and Antitrust Page 5 
 
should be no antitrust presumption against standards, even those that are 
jointly set by competing firms. 
 
 Nevertheless, standards can also facilitate both of the evils that 
concern antitrust law -- namely, collusion and exclusion.  When standards 
are created or enforced by competing producers collusion is possible.  When 
they are used to keep some producers out of the market anticompetitive 
exclusion is possible. 
 
 Thus antitrust rules for standard setting will permit the great majority 
of standard setting activities to proceed.  But they will also identify some 
instances where standards are used anticompetitively.  Antitrust performs 
this function best by identifying clearly what the dangers are, specifying the 
conditions under which those dangers are likely to be realized, and then 
paying special attention to standard setting in situations that meet those 
conditions. 
 
 Importantly, if the standards in question are complex, the antitrust 
decision maker must avoid becoming overly involved in the substantive 
merits of the standard itself.  Antitrust tribunals, particular juries, lack the 
technical skills to answer such questions as whether chiropractic is really a 
legitimate form of medical practice,9 whether a particular medical procedure 
is safe and effective,10 or whether a particular engineering standard is 
necessary for passenger limousines.11  Well formulated antitrust rules should 
try to evaluate standard setting whenever possible by avoiding these difficult 
technological issues. 
 
                                            
9.  E.g., Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 927 (1990) (condemning AMA standard setting rule that excluding 
chiropractors). 
10.  E.g., Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 
397 400 (7th Cir.1989) (radial keratotomy); Hassan v. Spicer, 2006 WL 
228958 (E.D.N.Y., Jan 31, 2006) (nuclear cardiology). 
11.  See Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 
2004).  See also Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 
126, 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980) (commercial 
refrigerators); Consolidated Metal Prod., Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute, 
846 F.2d 284, 296 (5th Cir.1988) (oil well drilling heads); Moore v. Boating 
Industry Ass'ns., 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987) 
(submersible boat trailer tail lights). 
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 In the great majority of cases an antitrust tribunal can evaluate 
standards by looking, not at the substantive "reasonableness" of the 
standard itself, but at such issues as the number and identity of the persons 
making the standard, the exclusionary power that the standard generates, or 
other signs of the standard's potential to facilitate collusion or exclude rivals 
and facilitate the exercise of market power.  This is not to say that antitrust 
can always avoid substantive evaluations of standards, but rather that it need 
do so in only a few situations. 
 
 The history of antitrust policy suggests that it has been unreasonably 
hostile toward private standard setting.  Nonetheless, many of the early 
standard setting antitrust cases provoked legitimate competitive concerns, 
and some where nothing more than fronts for naked collusion. 
 
Standards, Product Differentiation, and Collusion 
 
 One explanation for antitrust's traditional hostility toward joint standard 
setting is that many of the early cases involved obvious, often ham handed, 
attempts at price fixing.  This seemed to create a mindset that found jointly 
set standards to be anticompetitive. 
 
 Standards facilitate collusion by minimizing product or service 
differentiation, or by making product specifications or terms readily 
observable across sellers.  Cartels are much more difficult to manage when 
products are differentiated or sold subject to unique specifications.  The 
fewer variables that cartel members must observe, the easier it is to stabilize 
a cartel equilibrium.12  These observations generally apply to both "explicit" 
price fixing and to the more informal methods of collusion that we generally 
associate with oligopoly industries. 
 
 Antitrust history is fairly filled with attempts to facilitate collusion by 
standardizing products, terms of sale, delivery, or other components of a 
transaction.  In Standard Sanitary a cartel of bathroom pottery manufacturers 
was led by a patentee who licensed its finishing process to other cartel 
                                            
12.  See F.M. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance 279 (3d ed. 1990); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 76-77 (2d 
ed. 2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and 
Execution 132 (2006).  On oligopoly pricing under product differentiation, see 
W.K. Viscusi, J.M. Vernon, & J.E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of Regulation 
and Antitrust 108-112 (3d ed. 2000); Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust 
Policy: the Law of Competition and its Practice ''4.1a, 4.2a, 4.4b (3d ed. 
2005). 
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members.  The cartel then designated goods that did not employ this 
process as "seconds" and required cartel members either to destroy them or 
ship them abroad in a fairly obvious attempt to reduce the output sold on the 
domestic market.13  In addition, the cartel fixed the price of all the goods that 
were designated first quality. 
 
 In the more famous National Macaroni case the defendants 
responded to a temporary shortage of durum semolina wheat by setting a 
product standard for pasta that called for 50% durum semolina and 50% 
inferior farina wheat.14  The standard was intended to suppress the price of 
durum semolina, and thus reduce the defendants' production costs.15  
                                            
13.  Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 41 (1912).  
Cf. Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482-483 (7th Cir. 1946) 
(noting testimony "that sales of 'firsts' as 'seconds' was a method of indirect 
price cutting."). 
14.  Nat. Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n., 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 
421 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 
 The recent and troublesome decision in Golden Bridge Technology, 
Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 385222 (E.D.Tex. Feb. 17, 
2006) falls closest to this category, at least in the eyes of the court.  The 
plaintiff complained that it developed a patented technology for cellular 
phones which it wished to license to the cell phone companies.  Acting 
through their standard setting organization, however, the cell phone 
companies adopted standards that excluded the technology and thus 
avoided the license fees.  The court refused to dismiss a complaint that 
adoption of the standard amounted to a per se antitrust boycott.  While a 
standard setting organization is free to adopt a lower cost standard, the effect 
of its adoption may be to prevent individual members from licensing the 
disapproved technology even if they wanted to.  Nevertheless, antitrust's per 
se rule is reserved for practices that are so clearly anticompetitive that 
detailed inquiry into the market structure or the effects of the practice are 
unnecessary.  This hardly seems like such a case.  The court analogized to 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 (1988), 
discussed infra.  But in Allied Tube the plaintiff was not asking other 
manufacturers in the organization to license its technology, it simply wanted 
market approval side-by-side with other products. 
15.  Contrast Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 461-462 (1st Cir. 1949), 
which refused to condemn a trade association's rules that both standardized 
the format and design of shipping tags and required detailed reporting 
concerning prices.  The FTC had argued that the product standardization 
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Similarly the C-O-Two decision seems to have involved nothing more than a 
naked cartel accomplished by turning a product differentiated industry into a 
completely standardized one.16  The defendants made fire extinguishers that 
were publicly bid to government purchasers such as schools.  They agreed 
on product specifications that were so detailed that the extinguishers could 
not be differentiated from one another except by the manufacturer's 
identification tag.17  In condemning the restraint the court found, first, that it 
facilitated price fixing, and second, that the standards were completely 
unnecessary to the safe and effective operation of the fire extinguishers.  
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of standardized container sizes, the 
court reached the same conclusion in the Milk Institute case, which involved 
agreements that standardized the sizes of milk containers when the 
agreements were being used to facilitate price fixing.18 
 
 Several antitrust cases also involve standardization of terms of sale 
                                                                                                                                   
made price collusion much easier; the court replied: 
 
  Nor is the conclusion of the Commission strengthened by its finding 
that the administration of the reporting agreements "was materially 
assisted by the standardization of the component parts of tags and 
tag products developed and adopted under the auspices of the 
respondent Institute." ... These standardizations are deemed to be to 
the advantage of all concerned, including the consumer who, among 
other benefits, is thereby better enabled to know what he is buying 
and to make intelligent price comparisons. Of course, the detailed 
standardization of tags and components which the Institute has 
assisted in developing tends to make more serviceable the 
information reported ... under the Tag Industry Agreement and ... 
collated and disseminated among the Subscribers. But if the reporting 
agreement is otherwise lawful, such enhanced usefulness of the 
agreement as results from standardization would hardly infect it with 
illegality. 
16.  C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).  See also United States v. Am. Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 948 (1971) (condemning standard setting agreement on household 
radiators that effectively eliminated lower price, lower quality products). 
17.  Id. at 493. 
18.  Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946). 
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and delivery.  For example, in Catalano the Supreme Court condemned an 
agreement that standardized credit terms for the wholesaling of beer to 
retailers.19  The courts have routinely condemned "basing point" pricing and 
related agreements among sellers to standardize delivery terms.20  And in 
the famous 1936 Sugar Institute case the Supreme Court  condemned an 
agreement among sugar manufacturers to issue standardized price lists for 
sugar and then to adhere to the lists while they were in force.21 
 
 To be sure, the pricing mechanism itself can be improved by standard 
setting.  Standardized price terms can reduce consumer search costs and 
minimize fraud or misrepresentation.  Here, antitrust has taken the 
administratively defensible position that for most pricing standards the risks 
of collusion are simply too high in relation to the gains.  As a result, 
promulgation of standards concerning pricing should come from the 
government.22  Indeed, even here some of the most anticompetitive of 
statutory regimes are those that regulate such things as the posting of retail 
liquor or wine prices, effectively permitting sellers to collude.23 
                                            
19.  Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).  See 12 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &2022 (2d ed. 2004). 
20.  E.g., FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) (condemning an 
agreed upon basing-point pricing system for the sale of glucose); Corn 
Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (similar).  See also FTC v. 
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700 (1948) (condemning agreement to 
employ basing point pricing; noting its tendency to lead to complete 
uniformity of pricing, particularly when the product at issue is fungible); 
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484-485 (1st Cir. 
1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989) (Breyer, J.).  On the economics, 
see George J. Stigler, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, 39 Am. Econ. 
Rev.  1143 (Aug. 1949); Frederic M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market 
Structure and Economic Performance 505-506 (3d ed. 1990); Dennis W. 
Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 26 J.L. & Econ. 51 
(1983); David Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive v. Collusive 
Theories, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 289 (1982). 
21.  Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). 
22.  A notable exception is Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC (CDA), 526 U.S. 756 
(1999) (advertising rules of dental association effectively ban most price 
advertising and all quality advertising). 
23.  E.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); TFWS v. Schaefer, 
242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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 A few of these decisions, such as Milk Institute, undoubtedly reached 
too far.  But most probably did not.  Further, they carry a fairly important 
message: product differentiation is still an important value, primarily because 
consumers have different preferences but also because it makes collusion 
more difficult to sustain.  Standards that do no more than reduce product 
differentiation in order to facilitate price matching do not provide a social 
benefit. 
 
 The values of product differentiation probably do not extend to the 
sizes of milk containers, however.  And school children might be safer if all 
fire extinguishers work exactly the same way so that teachers can reliably be 
trained one time for all of them. So antitrust must tread carefully even when it 
is attacking standard setting that might facilitate collusion.  If standard setting 
is accompanied by price fixing, as it very likely was in the C-O-Two and Milk 
Institute decisions, then the antitrust tribunal can always respond by 
condemning the price-fixing.  But most cases are more difficult and involve 
situations where standardization facilitates express or tacit collusion but the 
collusion itself is evidenced only by parallel prices.  In that case antitrust fact 
finders must look at other factors.  For example, do consumers benefit from 
the standard setting? Do the standards create the kind of product 
homogeneity that facilitates collusion, or do they merely regulate safety or 
functionality in ways that permit significant product differentiation along other 
avenues?  It is also important to determine whether non-producer interests 
have a significant role in the standard setting.  For example, while fire 
extinguisher producers have an interest in colluding on the price of fire 
extinguishers, fire insurance companies do not; they are benefitted by fire 
extinguishers that work as well as possible and are sold competitively. 
 
 Finally, the number of firms in the market is often important.  Cartels 
become much more difficult to manage as the number of significant firms in a 
market rises above a dozen or so.  Informal cartels, or those relying on tacit 
rather than express collusion, may require even fewer.  While a large number 
of participants is an indicator that collusion is less likely, however, in some 
cases collusive output reductions and higher prices are quite possible even 
though the market has numerous competitors.  This can happen when the 
standard in question is itself a direct restraint on output or pricing and 
violation of the standard is readily observable by other cartel members.  For 
example, even though the NCAA has several hundred members its rule 
limiting nationally televised football games served to reduce output 
anticompetitively.24  No member could surreptitiously cheat on the cartel by 
                                            
24.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  At 
the time of the litigation the NCAA had 850 members.  Id. at 89. 
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secretly televising a football game.  Accordingly, the number of nationally 
televised games increased significantly and TV advertising rates fell after the 
rule was lifted.25  In sum, a large number of firms in the market subject to 
standard setting is often relevant but need not be decisive.  One must always 
consider how the collusive restraint on output or price is being carried out. 
 
Exclusion and Standard Setting 
 
 Before firms can charge monopoly prices they must be able to do two 
things.  The first is to coordinate the output and pricing decisions of existing 
producers.  The difficulty of accomplishing this ranges from nil in the case of 
the monopolist, which absolutely controls its own price and output, to quite 
severe if the market has a large number of firms, and particularly if the firms 
use different technologies or produce differentiated products. 
 
 But firms bent on monopoly must also keep the output of others out of 
the market.  Standard setting can accomplish this by setting standards in 
such a fashion that only a small number of compliant firms meet the 
standard, or the standard is licensed to only such firms. 
 
 At the same time, if a standard setting process is at all meaningful one 
or more firms will either "flunk" the standard or else have to make a 
significant investment in order to comply with it.  The most common antitrust 
claim involving standard-setting is that it is used to limit competition by 
excluding rivals, whether it be restrictive bar passage rates,26 hospital 
accreditation standards that exclude chiropractors,27 surgical standards that 
                                            
25.  Accord Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) 
(69,000 members, of whom 12,000 were active consulting engineers 
affected by the challenged canon against competitive bidding). 
26.  Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (bar exam grading standards 
were promulgated by state supreme court and qualified for antitrust "state 
action" immunity); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court (Arizona), 
410 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2005) (similar). 
27.  Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 
U.S. 927 (1990) (condemning AMA rule excluding chiropractors from access 
to important inputs such as hospital X-ray facilities).  See also Hahn v. 
Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1028-1029 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989) (exclusion of podiatrists); Schachar v. American 
Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 400 (7th Cir.1989) 
(standards for eye surgery that allegedly discriminated against radial 
keratotomy).  And see Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 
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protect against cost cutting medical procedures,28 or building code or product 
safety standards that protect incumbent firms from threatening 
technologies.29  Network standards might keep some firms off the network, 
perhaps imposing prohibitive costs on them in the process.  Closely related 
is the proprietary standard protected by intellectual property rights, whose 
licensing costs imposed on rivals create a price umbrella protecting the IP 
holders.  Sometimes these standards are created or made enforceable with 
the help of the government, thus implicating antitrust's Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, which gives a measure of quasi-constitutional protection to petitions 
to the government for anticompetitive actions.30  Sometimes they are created 
by private bodies which have a significant influence over government 
decision-making.31 
 
 To repeat an earlier warning: Antitrust is often way outside its 
competence if it attempts to evaluate standard setting by examining the 
technological merits of the challenged standard.  Although antitrust contains 
                                                                                                                                   
F.3d 1026, 1032, 1037 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) (law 
school accreditation standards that, in part, linked accreditation to professor 
salaries); United States v. ABA, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421 (1995) (consent decree 
limiting ABA's ability to tie law school accreditation to faculty compensation). 
28.  Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 341 (1991) (physician 
allegedly denied staff privileges because he had developed lower cost 
procedure for conducting eye surgery that required only one surgeon instead 
of two). 
29.  Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) 
(defendant's manipulated standard setting organization in order to 
disapprove plaintiff's plastic electrical conduit in order to protect market for 
traditional steel conduit); Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Inc., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (officer of society of mechanical 
engineers participated in fraudulent scheme to discredit plaintiff's valve); 
Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute, 846 F.2d 
284 (5th Cir. 1988) (institute made up of manufacturers and users of oil well 
equipment refused to approve plaintiff's allegedly innovative and lower cost 
design). 
30.  E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 
494 (1988); Union Oil Co., ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15618 
(FTC, July 6, 2004) (patented status for cleaner burning gasoline). 
31.  E.g., Allied Tube, supra; Hydrolevel, supra. 
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a rule of reason, "reasonableness" in this context refers to the impact of a 
standard on competition, not to the substantive reasonableness of the 
standard itself.  In most private antitrust cases the plaintiff seeks damages, 
and as a result most of them contemplate a jury trial.  Except in clear cases 
of abuse, juries are not up to answering technical questions concerning the 
necessity or appropriateness of a particular standard. 
 
Concerted Standard Making and Exclusion 
 
 The antitrust problem of concerted standard setting that excludes 
rivals is a half century old, including the 1943 AMA case which condemned 
the AMA for adopting an "ethical" standard that forbad physicians from 
working for prepaid health organizations.32  The grandparent of explicit 
product safety standards cases is the 1961 Radiant Burner decision, in which 
the Supreme Court sustained the complaint of a gas heater manufacturer 
alleging that it was excluded from the market by an industry safety standard 
that had been biased and capriciously enforced.33 
 
 Radiant Burners suggested that one should evaluate standards by 
looking at the intent of those setting them.  But there are better ways for 
courts to proceed, and Radiant Burners itself suggests some of them.  The 
defendants in that case included not only competing manufacturers of gas 
heaters, but also natural gas utilities and pipeline companies.  One can easily 
see why a competing heater manufacturer would wish to exclude a cheaper 
or more efficient burner, or simply remove rivals from the market generally.  
But natural gas utilities and gas pipeline companies sell a complementary 
                                            
32.  AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 532-533 (1943). 
33.  Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
(1961) (reversing lower courts' dismissal on pleadings).  Cf. Carleton v. 
Vermont Dairy Herd Improvement Ass'n., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D. Vt. 
1991) (plaintiff's claim that market dominating milk testing organization 
disapproved his milk without subjecting it to a fair test stated claim under rule 
of reason); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 
1008, 1018 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974) (granting 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of plaintiff's suspension resulting 
from dispute over blood typing; emphasizing denial of due process or any 
effective right to challenge association decision making or even obtain a 
clear statement of the problem).  Contrast Eliason Corp. v. Nat. Sanitation 
Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980) (approving 
standard setting program that did not attempt to exclude disapproved 
products from the market or test them in a discriminatory fashion). 
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product and would have not ordinarily have any incentive to keep a safe, 
efficient heater off the market.  Indeed, they might share liability for fires 
caused by unsafe heaters.  Further, while control of the natural gas industry 
by a burner maker or even a cartel of them is possible, it is quite unlikely and 
almost certain to be apparent to a fact finder. 
 
 This suggests that an early inquiry in challenges to exclusionary 
standard setting should be structural, asking whether the defendants (or a 
controlling number of them) are likely to have anticompetitive incentives.  The 
Seventh Circuit's Moore decision suggests the proper approach.  The plaintiff 
made a submersible tail light for boat trailers, which was excluded by an 
association of boat trailer manufacturers because of a tendency to short 
out.34  The court found no antitrust violation, observing that the plaintiff tail 
light manufacturer did not compete with the trailer makers who controlled the 
association, and that trailer manufacturers would have no incentive to place 
an anticompetitive restraint on tail light manufacturers.  They wished only to 
purchase safe tail lights that complied with federal specifications.35 
 
 
 As with standard setting intended to facilitate collusion, the number of 
players can be relevant.  If the firms in a market are so numerous that 
collusion is impossible then they may have little incentive to exclude another 
                                            
34.  Moore v. Boating Industry Ass'ns., 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 854 (1987). 
35.  Id. at 699: 
 
 Manufacturers of boat trailers, some of which are members of TMA, 
are customers for trailer lamps. The trailer manufacturers do not make 
lamps. There is no competition between lamp and trailer 
manufacturers. The latter are the customers of the former....  It would 
seem to make no difference to a trailer manufacturer from whom he 
bought lamps, so long as they complied with federal safety standards 
and thus did not expose the trailer manufacturer to federal penalties of 
fines and recalls. 
 
See also M & H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 
980 (1st Cir. 1984) (track owners excluding plaintiff had no financial interest 
in tire production); Jessup v. AKC, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 5, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), 
aff=d mem., 210 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001) 
(rejecting antitrust challenge to breed standards; AKC "does not compete or 
engage in the breeding, selling or showing of" Labrador Retrievers). 
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firm.  However, even firms who are behaving competitively vis-a-vis one 
another have an incentive to exclude lower cost or superior technologies 
from the market, particularly if they themselves cannot readily obtain access 
to the technology.  Even if the slide rule market contains 100 firms who 
compete aggressively on price and slide rule design, these firms still have an 
incentive to keep electronic calculators off the market if they believe that the 
calculators constitute a major competitive threat to the demand for slide 
rules.  For example, the standard setting organization in the Allied Tube case 
contained several thousand members.36  In that case a manufacturer of steel 
electric conduit, fearing that the plaintiff's plastic conduit was both cheaper 
and superior, organized a cartel that manipulated the standard setting 
process so as to disapprove the plastic conduit.  In this case the numerosity 
of the membership did not mitigate competitive concerns because the 
concern was not price fixing but rather the removal of a threatening, superior 
product from the market.  Someone who wanted to cheat on the cartel could 
not surreptitiously flood the market with the excluded product. 
 
Standard Making and Unilateral Acts by Dominant Firms 
 
 In markets where interfirm compatibility is valuable dominant firms (or 
dominant cartels or coalitions) typically profit by maintaining incompatibility 
with rivals.  By maintaining incompatibility a dominant firm protects itself from 
new entry or raises the costs of its rivals -- thus, for example, Microsoft's 
efforts to ensure that the Windows operating system would not become 
compatible with rival operating systems or that new rival systems be 
permitted to emerge.37  By contrast, survival or growth for a nondominant 
firm may require it to become compatible with the dominant firm's 
technology.38 
                                            
36.  Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 
(1988).  According to its website the National Fire Protection Association, or 
NFPA, has 79,000 members today. See NFPA.org.  The number involved in 
the vote to disapprove plastic conduit was 784, and the conduit was 
disapproved by a vote of 394 to 390.  See 486 U.S. at 497. 
37.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 
2000) (conclusions of law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (speaking of Microsoft's efforts to 
prevent Sun Microsystem's Java from becoming a medium that would make 
rival operating systems more compatible with Microsoft Windows). 
38.  See 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &776 (2d 
ed. 2002). 
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 Exceptions exist to both of these rules.  First, a dominant firm may 
decide to open its architecture, believing it can earn more from marketwide 
acceptance and licensing.  IBM made this decision with respect to the 
personal computer architecture in the early 1980s.  Second, even a 
nondominant firm, such as Apple computer, might wish to preserve 
incompatibility in a product differentiated market if it occupies a profitable 
market niche. 
 
 In monopolized markets "standard setting" often refers to nothing 
more than the dominant firm's selection of a standard, which other firms are 
largely obliged to accept or else be relegated to small niches.  For example, 
once Kodak, a film monopolist, selects a format for its Instamatic, cartridge-
loading camera-and-film system, rival camera makers such as Berkey Photo 
may have very little choice but to design a compatible camera.39 
 
 Should a dominant firm's unilateral selection of a standard be grounds 
for antitrust liability when the de facto result is that the selected standard 
becomes the market standard, perhaps raising the costs of rivals or in 
extreme cases excluding them altogether? Antitrust does not condemn "no 
fault" monopolization.  About the closest we have ever come is an "essential 
facility" doctrine that may force a firm to share a technology that is essential 
for market access.  The Supreme Court's 2004 Trinko decision leaves few 
opportunities for use of that doctrine.40  A corollary would seem to be that a 
firm selecting a technology for its own products has no duty to protect its 
rivals' market by ensuring the compatibility of their competing or 
complementary products. 
 
 The essential facility doctrine speaks of the terms under which a firm 
may be required to share an existing technology.  However, the intentional 
selection of a technology that excludes rivals is a more aggressive act.  One 
might say that, while a firm has no duty to share its resources or inputs, it 
                                            
39.  Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (rejecting claim that Kodak had an 
antitrust obligation to "predisclose" its design so that rivals could invent 
around it and have copies ready by the time the product was introduced).  
Accord California Computer Prods. v. IBM (CalComp), 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 
1979) (IBM's design of personal computer with integrated components forced 
rivals to adopt the same technology). 
40.  Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP,  540 U.S. 
398 (2004). 
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does have an obligation not to adopt a standard that excludes rivals 
unnecessarily.  But antitrust tribunals cannot be in the business of making 
technology choices for firms.  Further, product complementarity is a common 
feature of technologically sophisticated products, and incompatibility is often 
a consequence of technological success.  If Kodak's Instamatic film system 
had been a flop, a rival camera maker would be unlikely to complain about its 
inability to produce complementary products.41 
 
 Another reason for deferring to the technology choice of the dominant 
firm is that typically the old technology remains available.  In that case 
consumers are not injured by the dominant firm's innovation because they 
can still purchase the older product; they simply fail to obtain the full benefit 
of competition in the new technology.  To be sure, this is not necessarily the 
case.  Kodak might simultaneously introduce its Instamatic film system and 
withdraw from the older film format, thus forcing all consumers to the new 
technology.  But it is difficult to claim that consumers are injured by a new, 
monopolized technology when the existing technology remains fully in place. 
 About all we can say is that consumers lose the ability to migrate to the new 
technology at the competitive price. 
 
 One might rationally conclude that a completely unilateral technology 
choice that becomes an industry standard should never be the basis for an 
antitrust claim, no matter how much damage the technology choice does to 
rivals.  Among the range of positions that one could take on this issue, I 
believe this would be better than any position that required juries to make 
substantive technological judgments (except in very clear cases) or that tried 
to discern the defendant's intent.  It would clearly be better than any rule that 
required court's to make substantive ex post assessments about the 
consumer benefits that result from a particular technological choice.  
Innovation always occurs under great uncertainty, and not every successfully 
marketed innovation is a clear winner for consumer welfare. 
 
 However, a rule of complete nonliability probably goes too far.  
Situations exist where firms set out to re-design products for no other 
purpose (objectively measured) than to make rival technologies 
incompatible.  The C.R. Bard case in the Federal Circuit may have been 
such a situation.42  The defendant was the dominant manufacturer of a 
patented biopsy gun used for taking skin samples.  The gun itself was 
                                            
41.  See Berkey Photo, supra. 
42.  C.R. Bard v. M3 Systems, 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
526 U.S. 1130 (1999). 
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durable but used disposable needles that captured and enclosed tiny pieces 
of human skin, which could then be sent to the laboratory.  The needles had 
been unpatented and were made by numerous manufacturers, subject only 
to the requirement that their connection end be structurally compatible with 
the collar on the gun.  The defendant then redesigned the collar and 
developed a new patented needle43 that was the only one compatible with 
the gun.  The jury rejected the defendant's argument that the re-designed 
gun collar and needle were a technological improvement.44 
 
 Assuming the strongest case -- namely, that the dominant firm 
intentionally re-designed its dominant product in such a way that it was not 
an improvement at all, but simply moved complementary products from  a 
competitive to a monopolized environment -- one might wish to preserve 
some basis for antitrust liability.  Of course, one still needs to ask how a 
dominant firm can "monopolize" by making a complementary product 
incompatible with that of rivals.  The so-called "leverage" theory of tying 
arrangements, which was that tying of monopolized and competitive 
products turned one monopoly into two, was discredited in the literature a 
half century ago.45  Kodak or Bard can earn all the monopoly profits available 
in their markets by setting a monopoly price for the camera or biopsy gun.  
They cannot make a larger monopoly profit simply by monopolizing the 
complementary product as well. 
 
 One reason a firm in Kodak's or C.R. Bard's position might try to 
create incompatibility in complementary products is to further price 
discrimination.  If the value that users place on the biopsy gun is a function of 
how often they use it, then Bard can charge a higher price for needles and 
earn greater returns from high intensity users than from low intensity users.  
Price discrimination itself is not a good reason for condemning such a 
practice, because its welfare consequences are so indeterminant.  Such a 
price discrimination scheme is likely to increase rather than reduce the output 
of biopsy guns, thus making it a poor candidate for a claim of 
monopolization.46  Further, the profitability of even inefficient price 
                                            
43.  Actually, the new patent was a combination patent covering the gun plus 
the needle.  See id., 157 F.3d at 1347. 
44.  C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1382. 
45.  Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 
Yale L.J. 19 (1957).  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, note 
12 at '10.6a. 
46.  For example, under the older technology Bard would charge everyone 
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discrimination schemes does not necessarily depend on the exclusion of a 
rival.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not a mandate to the courts to 
condemn economically efficient practices, but only those practices that are 
unreasonably exclusionary. 
 
 But there are other explanations.  For example, viable competition in 
the market for the complementary product may provide the platform for entry 
into the market for the primary product.  Or alternatively, innovation by rivals 
in the complementary product may increase the likelihood that alternative 
technologies will emerge.  For example, the concern in Microsoft was not 
that Microsoft wanted to exclude Netscape in order to charge higher prices 
for either Windows or Internet Explorer.  Rather, it was that a viable 
Netscape complemented with Java would increase the compatibility between 
Windows and rival operating systems, or else facilitate the emergence of 
rival platforms.47  If that should happen Microsoft might be relegated to one 
among many players in a product differentiated operating system market.  As 
is so often the case in antitrust, such concerns are highly specific to the 
industry.  As a result, one hesitates to adopt overly categorical rules in either 
direction. 
 
 Another issue concerns the firm that participates in a standard setting 
process while withholding information about IP rights that it has or is in the 
process of perfecting.  While the facts vary, in the typical case the firm waits 
until the standard has been adopted and then surprises participants by 
asserting the IP right and demanding royalties from those that cannot comply 
with the standard without infringement.   
 
 Antitrust remedies for unilateral conduct are appropriate only for 
monopolization.  This does not mean that antitrust should never intervene 
when such abuses occur, but it must stick to its insistence on power and 
anticompetitive effects.  At the other extreme, it is incorrect to conclude that 
antitrust does not apply because under the antitrust laws a firm is free to 
                                                                                                                                   
the profit-maximizing price for the gun because it has no control over the 
needles, which are sold in a competitive market.  Under the new scheme it 
might charge less than the monopoly price for the gun, or even give it away, 
but place all or part of the overcharge in the needles.  As a result, low 
intensity users unwilling to pay the old monopoly price will be able to 
purchase the gun, and of course Bard will earn even more from high intensity 
users who consumer a large number of needles.  See Hovenkamp, Federal 
Antitrust Policy, note 12 at '10.6e. 
47.  See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Enterprise, note 3 at 292-298. 
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refuse to license its patents.48  That position confuses two issues.  One is the 
fact that a "mere" refusal to license is not an antitrust violation.49  The other is 
that compulsory licensing of patents is a common remedy for conduct that 
has been found to violate the antitrust laws.50 
 
 Nevertheless a misrepresentation rises to the level of an antitrust 
violation only when it permits the offender to dominate a market, or creates a 
dangerous probability that this will occur.  Or to say it different, the 
misrepresentation satisfies the conduct component of the offense of 
monopolization or attempt to monopolize, but the structural component of the 
offense must also be proven, as well as causation.51  Proving structure may 
require a showing that the standard dominates a relevant market, and also 
that the patent is either necessary for meeting the standard or that the costs 
of meeting it without infringing the patent are higher. 
 
 As a result, doctrines derived from the patent laws, such as equitable 
estoppel, or even contract law are generally more appropriate for addressing 
such holdup problems.52  Most importantly, standard setting processes must 
                                            
48.  See, e.g., Townshend v. rockwell Intl. Corp., 2000 WL 433505, 2000-1 
Trade Cas. &72890, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011 (N.D.Cal. March 28, 2000) 
(reasoning from premise that the antitrust laws do not impose a duty to 
license to conclusion that alleged fraudulent misrepresentation before a 
standard setting body did not violate the antitrust laws when the requested 
remedy involved compelled licensing). 
49.  See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 2, Ch. 13.  Compulsory licensing 
is a rarity in patent law, although there are some exceptions.  For example, 
an unused 1970 amendment in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. '7608, provides 
that the Attorney General can seek judicially supervised compulsory 
licensing of patented technology necessary to achieve clean air standards, 
where such licensing might be needed to avoid giving the patentee a 
monopoly. 
50.  Contrast &709 and &710 in 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp 
Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2002). 
51.  See Hovenkamp, et al, IP and Antitrust, '35.5b. 
52.  See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Ag, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003) (refusing to find a duty to disclose 
under state common law of fraud; also finding that standard could be met 
without infringing Rambus' patent claims); Wang Labs v. Mitsubishi elecs., 
103 F.3d 157 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818 (1997) (patentee 
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be defined in such a way as to give firms incentives to disclose their IP 
claims and place a price on them in advance of adoption, after which the 
exercise of market power is typically far more likely.53  Failures are probably 
best addressed via the institutional design of standard setting procedures, 
including predisclosure obligations, rather than by antitrust. 
 
Government Involvement in Anticompetitive Standard Setting 
 
 Federal and state governments are the largest standard setters in the 
economy.  The vast majority of these standards are readily available for 
private appropriation and completely consistent with competition.  For 
example, government agencies might define a standard for grade A milk or 
prime beef, bar passage and licensing of attorneys, or safety of electrical 
components.  Any firm or person who can comply with the standards may 
lawfully sell in the market.54 
                                                                                                                                   
equitably estopped from asserting a patent when it had encouraged others to 
adopt a standard containing the patent); accord Stambler v. Diebold, 1988 
WL 95479, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd mem., 878 F.2d 1445 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (patentee who knew it had patent covering standard 
adopted in procedure in which it participated, and who kept silent, later 
equitably estopped from enforcing the patent); Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. 
Proxim Inc., 2004 WL 1770290 (D.Del. Jul 28, 2004) (refusing to assert 
equitable estoppel where patentee did not mislead other participant in 
standard setting process about the existence of its patents).  See also in re 
Dell Computer Corp., No. 93-10097 (F.T.C. 1995) (consent decree under 
which Dell agreed not to assert IP rights when it had represented in 
standard-setting process that it in fact had no such rights).  Cf. in re Rambus, 
Inc., FTC No. 9302 (Feb. 24, 2004), an initial decision in which the 
administrative law judge held that a firm could withhold information about 
pending patent applications even when the standard setting process in which 
it was participating required disclosure.  These issues are thoroughly 
explored in Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 2, at '35.5b.  See also Mark 
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 
90 Cal.L.Rev. 1889 (2002). 
53.  See Daniel G. Swanson and William J. Baumol, Reasonable and 
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection and Control of 
Market Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2005). 
54.  For example, the standards for electrical components at issue in Allied 
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 (1988), were 
placed in local government building codes. 
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 Claims that direct government involvement in private standard setting 
is anticompetitive typically arise in one of two ways.  In the first, some 
governmental or quasi-governmental entity adopts a standard put forward by 
private firms and claimed by rivals to be anticompetitive.  Such an action can 
implicate the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which declares that qualifying 
petitions to the government cannot be antitrust violations, even if the intent or 
effect of the requested action is anticompetitive.  For example, in the 
Columbia case the city of Columbia, South Carolina, adopted a land use 
standard regulating the size and spacing of billboard signs that favored the 
signs of a politically favored business firm and excluding those of a rival.55  
The Supreme Court applied the historical Noerr rule that private parties have 
a right, essentially protected by the First Amendment, to petition the 
government for even anticompetitive actions.  Rivals cannot use antitrust 
suits to challenge the legislation or executive action that results.  Indeed, the 
Noerr case itself was about a standard-setting campaign by railroads to 
induce the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impose cost-increasing 
standards on truckers, which were competing with the railroads for freight 
business.56  The history of regulation is fairly filled with the efforts of this or 
that interest group to impose restrictive standards on rivals that either 
increase the rivals' costs or remove their competition from the market 
altogether.57 
 
 Significantly, Noerr protects the petitioning process by which 
anticompetitive government regulation is made.  However, it does not protect 
the marketplace results of that process.  For example, if a group of 
businesses petition a legislature for a statute that gives them the authority to 
                                            
55.  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 
(1991). 
56.  Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127, 130 (1961). 
57.  E.g., Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 
(11th Cir.), modified on reh'g., 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996) (government 
restrictions on power co-generation); Christian Memorial Cultural Center v. 
Michigan Funeral Directors Assn., 998 F.Supp. 772 (E.D.Mi. 1998) 
(regulations directed at discount funeral services); Certification in 
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. American Occupational Therapy Assn., 24 
F.Supp.2d 494 (D. Md. 1998) (legislative adoption of licensing restrictions on 
occupational therapists).  See 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law &&201-204 (3d ed. 2006). 
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exclude competition by setting standards Noerr would protect their right to 
obtain this legislation.  However, under the antitrust "state action" doctrine 
private conduct approved by that statute could still be challenged unless it 
was "actively supervised" by a public official or agency.58  The same thing 
generally applies to federal regulatory standards: private standard setting 
promulgated under such regimes is not immunized from the antitrust laws 
unless the relevant federal agency exercises sufficient oversight over the 
conduct.59 
 
 Finally, Noerr may not protect a firm that gives false information which 
distorts the process by which a government standard is created or applied.60 
 The previously discussed standards holdup problem can implicate Noerr 
when the standard maker is the government.  For example, in Unocal a firm 
allegedly proposed standards for low emission fuel to a state air quality 
agency while surreptitiously perfecting patent claims that covered those very 
                                            
58.  Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (physician discipline by peers; 
inadequate state supervision); Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 
1030 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (private 
standard setting for surgical procedures; inadequate supervision); Jiricko v. 
Coffeyville Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 700 F. Supp. 1559 (D. Kan. 
1988) (similar; peer review). Cf. Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa 
Medical Socy., 851 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1988) (immunizing exclusion of 
chiropractors from insurance coverage pursuant to medical society 
accreditation decision; state official supervised the process); Earles v. State 
Bd. of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (state board setting accountancy 
standards is "state itself" and needs no supervision). 
59.  E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) 
(unsupervised discipline by NYSE, a private group).  See also MCI 
Communic. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 891 (1983) (AT&T's unilateral setting of standards for 
interconnection by competing carriers not immunized when it was not 
sufficiently supervised by regulatory agency); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
1073 (1984) (similar). 
60.  E.g., Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (misrepresentations to FDA as part of drug approval process).  Cf. St. 
Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of America, 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (misrepresentations in application for certificate of need for new 
medical facility). 
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standards.61  Then, once the standards were adopted, it surprised rivals with 
the patents and requested large license fees.62 
 
 As in the case of purely private standard setting, antitrust liability in 
holdup cases should be reserved for the relatively rare situation in which 
there is a clear misrepresentation to the government standard maker and 
clear evidence that the agency relied on the misrepresentation in setting its 
standard.  In addition, the usual structural requirements for an antitrust 
violation must also be met.  Noerr protects a right to petition the government, 
but not the right to make false statements to a government decision maker.  
And, of course, one does not even get to these issues unless it is clear that 
the resulting standard plus the defendant's IP rights create a clear likelihood 
of monopoly pricing.  This could occur if the IP rights effectively excluded 
other firms from making the product subject to the standard and if that 
exclusion made it impossible for rival firms to compete effectively.  Once 
again, the case for a patent law remedy such as equitable estoppel is at least 
as strong here as it is in the case of the private standard setting 
                                            
61.  Union Oil Co., ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15618 (FTC, 
July 6, 2004). 
62.  As the FTC observed: 
 
 Awareness of potential competitive harm is particularly important in 
settings like the one presented here. Government regulations such as 
CARB's standards may impose potent entry barriers capable of 
preserving market power over extended periods of time.  Whereas an 
exercise of unprotected market power may sow the seeds of its own 
erosion if firms are free to enter and compete on equal terms with the 
incumbent, governmentally-enforced limits on entry may impede and 
even prevent that process.  Consequently, misrepresentations that 
distort government decision making in ways that create or shield 
market power may inflict severe and long-lasting public harm. Such 
considerations support our conclusion that the substantial public 
interest in antitrust enforcement may outweigh countervailing policy 
reservations when those concerns are sufficiently muted. 
 
(citations omitted). 
 
 The dispute was eventually resolved by a consent decree in which the 
FTC approved a merger between Unocal and Chevron, and Unocal agreed 
to dedicate the disputed patents to the public.  See 
http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/2005news/061005.htm (press release). 
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Conclusion 
 
 Given the ubiquity of standard setting in our economy and its 
undisputed promotion of social welfare, claims of anticompetitive standard 
setting must be scrutinized very closely.  Further, antitrust law is a fairly blunt 
instrument for dealing with such claims. Except in easy cases, antitrust fact 
finders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the substantive merits of 
a standard.  In any event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad 
standards.  It requires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum 
conditions for competitive harm are present can often be determined without 
examining the substance of the standard itself. 
 
 When government involvement in standard setting is substantial 
antitrust challenges should generally be rejected.  The petitioning process in 
a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral 
attack.  In any event, antitrust's purpose is to correct private markets.  It is 
not a general corrective for political processes that have gone awry.  The 
best case for antitrust liability in this context occurs when the government 
has somehow been deceived into adopting a standard that it would not have 
adopted had it known the true facts.  Even then, nonantitrust remedies such 
as equitable estoppel are probably a superior solution. 
                                            
63.  However, see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Immunex Corp., 84 
F.Supp.2d 574 (D.N.J. 2000), which concluded that because Noerr protected 
a firm's right to obtain an exclusive license based on alleged 
misrepresentations to the government, promissory estoppel based on same 
alleged misrepresentations could not be used to prevent it from enforcing 
those rights. 
